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Health Law:
Canadian Medical Tourism:
Expanding Opportunities and Reducing Legal Risks
for American Healthcare Providers
R. Gregory Cochran1
The term “medical tourism” commonly evokes an image of wealthy
Americans going to Switzerland for cosmetic surgery or not-so-wealthy
Americans going to Mexico or Canada for cheaper pharmaceutical
products. But medical tourism from other countries, including Canadians
coming to the U.S. for procedures, pharmaceuticals, and other
treatments, is growing rapidly. U.S. healthcare providers have found this
“Inbound Medical Tourism” market appealing economically because,
among other reasons, these patients usually pay all cash in advance.
To facilitate this line of business in the Canadian market, U.S.
providers sometimes establish relationships with “lay” for-profit
Canadian medical-tourism brokers to provide patients with assistance
arranging travel and coordinating the medical services. However,
depending on the financial aspects of such arrangements, the broker’s
referrals to the U.S. providers may subject the providers to risk under
U.S. fraud-and-abuse laws, including the federal Stark Law and
Antikickback Statute (AKS), as well as their state-level analogs. U.S.
providers may also experience great variability in the quality of
screenings of patients and in the quality of communications with the
Canadian primary-care medical practices.
This chapter demonstrates that, by eliminating lay Canadian medicaltourism brokers from the arrangements and shifting the responsibility for
providing the traditional broker services to a primary-care medical
practice that also identifies and screens the patients, U.S. providers can
reduce or even eliminate much potential fraud and abuse liability. This
model also improves the quality of the experience for patients because
they need only interact with the Canadian medical practice for all the
services. The U.S. providers also benefit by establishing ongoing
relationships with a single Canadian medical practice, rather than with a
broker whose clients are patients of countless physicians.

1. Summarized and excerpted from R. Gregory Cochran & Alicia Corbett,
Canadian Medical Tourism: Expanding Opportunities and Reducing Legal Risks for
American Healthcare Providers, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 211 (2017).
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In-Bound Canadian Medical Tourism from Canada
Despite generally higher prices in America than in many other
nations, Canadians are among many who travel to the United States for
medical care, seemingly motivated primarily by lengthy wait times for
nonemergency medical procedures and diagnostic tests in the Canadian
national healthcare system.2 Premier providers in the United States, such
as Cleveland Clinic and Mayo Clinic, have consistently attracted foreign
residents, particularly those from other nations in the Americas. In
addition to attracting patients with the world-class medicine they offer,
these institutions also assist international patients with arranging travel
and with every other aspect of their care and treatment. Canadian patients
who seek care from U.S. physicians and hospitals who do not offer those
medical tourism-related services often engage lay-owned or lay-operated
medical-tourism brokers or facilitators,3 who offer medical tourists the
gamut of services, ranging from travel packages to identifying physicians
and hospitals and brokering all aspects of both the medical and travel
arrangements.4
For several reasons, U.S. providers generally have not embraced
Inbound Medical Tourism. Some believe it adversely affects Americans’
access to, and allocation of, limited healthcare resources.5 However,
medical tourism does not do so, and it may in fact serve to increase
access to certain technologies, procedures, and treatments. Many U.S.
providers are also concerned about the financial risk in such unfamiliar
and relatively untested approach. However, if structured appropriately,
Inbound Medical Tourism can increase revenues to U.S. physicians, hospitals, and their local economies.
Some U.S. providers are also deterred from engaging in these
arrangements because of the generally recognized legal risk in
establishing financial relationships with referral sources under the myriad
federal and state healthcare fraud-and-abuse laws, including
2. Catherine Regis et al., Implementing Medical Travel in the Canadian Health
Care System: Considerations for Policy Makers, 20 HEALTH L.J. 73, 74, 83–84 (2013).
3. The terms lay owned or lay operated here mean that the entity is not owned or
operated by licensed healthcare professionals or healthcare entities.
4. See, e.g., Lydia Gan & James Frederick, Medical Tourism Facilitators: Patterns
of Service Differentiation, 17 J. VACATION MARKETING 165, 170 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Y. Y. Brandon Chen & Colleen M. Flood, Medical Tourism’s Impact
on Health Care Equity and Access in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Making the
Case for Regulation, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286 (2013); I. Glenn Cohen, Medical
Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011); Laura
Hopkins et al., Medical Tourism Today: What Is the State of Existing Knowledge?, 31 J.
PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 185, 192–94 (2010).
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antikickback, self-referral, and fee-splitting laws. One concern is that any
fees or other remuneration that U.S. medical providers pay to Canadian
lay-owned brokers may, without implementing substantial safeguards,
inappropriately encourage referrals and thus may be prohibited under
U.S. federal or state laws, many of which call for potentially severe
consequences for non-compliance.
It turns out that medical tourism arrangements between U.S. and
Canadian providers will not run afoul of the most feared U.S. federal
fraud-and-abuse laws—the Stark Law and AKS—even if a for-profit
medical-tourism broker is involved, because such laws apply only to
financial arrangements involving referrals for treatment and care of
beneficiaries of the U.S. Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal healthcare
payor programs, for which Canadians do not qualify. But certain state
antikickback, self-referral, and fee-splitting prohibitions typically apply
more broadly and are not limited in their applicability only to
arrangements where the patients are Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal
healthcare-program beneficiaries.
A U.S. provider’s risk of running afoul of such laws is substantially
reduced by replacing the for-profit, lay-owned entity with a Canadian
medical practice that does not seek to profit from the arrangement to
provide the broker’s usual services. Further, proposed changes to
applicable state fraud-and-abuse laws can essentially eliminate legal risk
arising out of Inbound Medical Tourism ventures. Without
compromising their patient-protection policy goals, such revised laws
would assure potentially interested medical-tourism service providers
that properly structured arrangements will be safer from a compliance
perspective.
Benefits and Nonlegal Risks
The Inbound Medical Tourism model proposed here can financially
benefit both the participating U.S. medical providers and the local
economies where such providers are located. The model has potential
drawbacks, including harms to the U.S. population, but the potential
benefits outweigh the potential risks.
Using appropriately structured models, U.S. providers benefit from
increasing medical tourism to their facilities and communities. Canadian
medical tourists pay the U.S. providers in advance for care out-of-pocket,
improving cash flow and revenue and, in some cases, offsetting declining
revenues from the providers’ other sources, including private and
government insurance programs.
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Medical tourists’ expenditures on travel confer another economic
benefit on the United States, particularly on the local area where the
services are provided, especially when medical tourists bring
companions or when they remain in the U.S. for some time to recover
before returning home. Medical tourism may also reduce the excess
capacity for some medical services in the U.S. Excess capacity and
underutilization may reduce recovery from investments in expensive
equipment such as MRIs, thereby discouraging investment and growth.6
Medical tourists absorb some of that excess capacity, thereby improving
the return on physicians’ and hospitals’ investments in such technology
and equipment.
Indeed, medical tourism can reduce access to healthcare for the
destination country’s poor, particularly for countries with dramatic and
clear disparities in access to healthcare between the rich and poor.7 For
several reasons, the Inbound Medical Tourism model proposed here
would not create or accentuate class-based disparities in access to care.
Inbound Medical Tourism may in many cases create a demand for
certain procedures and technology to improve the economies of scale for
implementing such procedures and technology, thus making them more
available to a larger segment of the region’s population. Further, the
class-based disparities in access to care are less likely to arise in this
model because the U.S. providers are not likely to begin turning away
patients and alienating their solid local network of referral physicians
because they prefer the terms associated with their Canadian patients.
Even if the model led to displacement of some U.S. patients, such
displacement should be relatively insignificant and short-lived and would
likely affect directly only the local market where medical tourists seek
treatment. At the same time, such ventures should have a net immediate
positive impact on health for the medical tourists and a net longer-term
improvement on health for the local population because of improved
access to more services and technology.
Applicable U.S. Laws
None of the U.S. federal fraud-and-abuse laws, such as the Stark
Law and the AKS, poses a barrier to the Inbound Medical Tourism
model proposed here. These laws pertain only to referrals of patients for
6. See Robert S. Kaplan & Michael E. Porter, How to Solve the Cost Crisis in
Health Care, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 47, 59 (2011).
7. See, e.g., Rupa Chanda, Trade in Health Services, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 158, 160 (2002).
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healthcare services financed by the U.S. federal Medicare, Medicaid, or
certain other healthcare programs,8 of which Canadian citizens who
reside in Canada are not and cannot be beneficiaries.9 These federal laws
therefore impose no prohibitions on Canadian Inbound Medical Tourism.
State fraud-and-abuse laws, however, present some risk to the
transactions necessary to effectuate the model because these state laws
typically are more broadly applicable to all healthcare services,
regardless of payor source. Examples of such laws include the California
Antikickback Statute and Health & Safety Code § 445 (collectively, the
California Antikickback Laws) and California’s Physician Ownership
and Referral Act (“PORA”). Providers may, however, implement certain
safeguards to minimize such risks without substantially affecting the
arrangement’s economic or practical benefits.
The California Antikickback Laws present liability risk under the
proposed model if any aspect of the compensation and services exchange
could be construed as “compensation or inducement for” the practice’s
referral of patients to the surgical group or to the hospital, respectively.10
From a business perspective, the parties would prefer not to ask patients
to pay each provider separately, so the model presumes cash will flow
from the patients to the U.S. surgical practice, which will then
redistribute the Canadian medical practice’s and the hospital’s portions
to them. This redistribution of proceeds, while not per se prohibited,
must avoid the appearance of improper “fee-splitting,” which the
California Antikickback Laws explicitly prohibit. Structuring the
arrangement so that the patients pay each of the three entities separately
and maintaining documentation that such payments are consistent with
the fair-market value of the services will substantially reduce risk for
liability under these laws.
California’s PORA, similar to the federal Stark law but not limited to
beneficiaries of federal healthcare programs, prohibits physicians from
referring patients to any provider of certain specified services (“PORACovered Services”) if the physician or a member of his or her immediate
family has a financial relationship with the provider that receives the
referral.11 PORA-Covered Services do not include surgical services,
however, so a Canadian medical practice’s financial relationship with a
8. Other federal health programs include the Veteran’s Administration,
CHAMPUS, and the Indian Health Services.
9. This analysis does not address whether a dual citizen of both the United States
and Canada, residing in Canada, may be an American Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary.
10. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650.
11. Id. § 650.02(a).
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U.S. surgical practice will not be subject to PORA if the Canadian
medical practice refers its patients to the U.S. surgical practice primarily
for surgical services. Although such referrals undoubtedly will include
some ancillary PORA-Covered Services, such as laboratory and x-ray
services, PORA does not prohibit referrals even for PORA-Covered
Services if the hospital “does not compensate the [physician] for the
referral.”12 Thus, even if the California agencies that enforce PORA were
to take the position that Canadian physicians are subject to PORA
(notwithstanding that they are not California “licensees” and
notwithstanding their physical presence outside California) their referrals
to a U.S. surgical practice and those to the U.S. hospital will comply with
PORA as long as none of the remuneration exchanged serves to
compensate the physician for the referral.
Legal Changes to Encourage Medical Tourism
Ensuring that any fees are based on the fair-market value of the
services provided will reduce but not eliminate the risk of liability under
relevant state laws. To eliminate the risk, state laws should create a
formal antikickback safe harbor and PORA exception for the kinds of
medical-tourism arrangements proposed here. A safe harbor under the
California Antikickback Laws could be a standalone statement like the
other safe harbors under the California Antikickback Statute and thus
could take the following form:
An arrangement under which a provider remits a portion of a
fee it collects from a patient to another provider or to a
broker that arranges administrative and/or travel services for
patients to travel to the provider, where such other provider
or broker is located outside of California, and where such
portion of such fee is consistent with fair market value for
the services provided by the out-of-state provider or broker,
and pursuant to a written arrangement between and among
the parties, shall not be deemed to violate this Section [650]
[445].
A PORA exception could be worded almost identically except to
delete the phrase “shall not be deemed to violate this Section [650]
[445]” to conform to PORA structure. Legislators also could make a
policy decision on whether to permit payment of a portion of the fee to
12. Id. § 650.02(c)(1).
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any broker or limit allowed payments to those made to other medical
professionals or medical practices.
These statutory revisions would permit U.S. surgical practices or
hospitals to collect the entire fee from the patient and in turn pay the
Canadian medical practice a reasonable fee based on the fair-market
value of the services provided by the Canadian medical practice in
administering the arrangement, without fear of legal liability or
regulatory scrutiny in California.
Conclusion
Although enabling medical tourists, particularly Canadians, to seek
care in U.S. hospitals can be a win-win situation for providers and their
communities, U.S. medical providers of services to medical tourists face
an uncertain regulatory environment with respect to the state equivalents
of the federal AKS and Stark Law. Providers may take certain steps to
significantly reduce this liability risk. To eliminate the risk, state
legislators and regulators should revise current laws to permit doctors
and hospitals to enter into a wider range of medical-tourism
arrangements. Lawmakers can do so without affecting the laws’ patientprotection policy goals, and such changes may also incentivize the
tourists’ home countries to ameliorate the problems that led their citizens
to seek care elsewhere.
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